RFC-SECOPS-0001                                              Section 7
Category: Standards Track                    Security Considerations

7. Security Considerations

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This section formalizes the security posture of the system and provides a structured threat analysis.

7.1 Security Objectives

The security model of this system is designed to satisfy the following objectives:

• Prevent unauthorized disclosure of secrets
• Prevent unauthorized mutation of secret values
• Minimize the impact of inevitable compromises
• Make authority explicit and auditable
• Eliminate implicit trust in human operators
• Preserve recoverability after partial or total failure

Security is treated as a structural property, not a configuration detail.

7.2 Trust Model and Root of Trust

7.2.1 Root of Trust Definition

The system has a single cryptographic root of trust established outside Kubernetes.

This root consists of:

• encryption keys used to protect bootstrap secrets in Git
• unseal key material used to initialize the runtime authority

This root:

• MUST be created once,
• MUST be stored securely offline,
• MUST NOT be committed to source control,
• and MUST NOT be regenerated during normal operation.

7.2.2 Trust Establishment Timeline

Trust is not global or permanent; it evolves by phase.

At no point does the system assume trust in:

• developer workstations,
• CI/CD runners,
• SaaS dashboards.

7.3 Trust Boundaries

Trust boundaries are explicit and enforced.

Primary Trust Boundaries

1. Offline → Git Encrypted intent crosses this boundary.

2. Git → Kubernetes Control Plane Declarative intent is reconciled.

3. Bootstrap → Runtime Authority One-time handover of secret values.

4. Runtime Authority → Workloads Controlled, read-only consumption.

Trust Boundary Diagram

No trust flows upward across these boundaries.

7.4 Identity and Authentication Model

7.4.1 Control Plane Identity

• GitOps controller authenticates to Kubernetes using native RBAC
• Orchestration and event systems authenticate using service accounts
• No shared credentials across components

7.4.2 Runtime Authority Authentication

• Kubernetes-native authentication mechanisms are used
• Each consuming system has:
  • a unique identity
  • scoped authentication permissions

No component authenticates as another.

7.4.3 Workload Authentication

Workloads:

• MUST NOT authenticate directly to the runtime authority
• consume secrets only through materialized Kubernetes Secrets

This reduces credential sprawl and attack surface.

7.5 Authorization and Access Control

7.5.1 Principle of Least Privilege

Each component MUST be granted:

• the minimum access required,
• scoped to namespace, path, or secret class.

7.5.2 Separation of Duties

No component spans multiple authority domains.

7.6 Threat Model

Assumed Threats

• Compromised workload pod
• Compromised namespace
• Expired or leaked credentials
• Operator error
• Partial cluster compromise

Explicitly Out-of-Scope Threats

• Kernel-level node compromise
• Physical access attacks
• Malicious Kubernetes control plane

These require separate mitigations.

7.7 Blast Radius Analysis

Compromised Workload

• Access limited to its own secrets
• No write capability
• No lateral movement via secret system

Compromised Kubernetes Namespace

• Affects only materialized secrets in that namespace
• Runtime authority remains intact
• Rotation can invalidate exposed credentials

Compromised Git Repository

• Secrets are encrypted
• No runtime secrets stored
• Rotation not affected

Compromised Runtime Authority

• Most severe scenario
• Requires:
  • secret rotation
  • potential re-bootstrap
• Impact contained by:
  • access policies
  • audit logs
  • explicit authority boundaries

7.8 Compromise Scenarios and Recovery

Credential Leak

• Trigger event-based rotation
• Revoke old credentials
• Propagate updates automatically

Unseal Key Exposure

• Rotate master keys
• Re-encrypt storage
• Re-establish root trust if necessary

Cluster Loss

• Rebuild cluster
• Reapply Git intent
• Restore runtime authority backend
• Resume steady-state operation

7.9 Security Guarantees and Limitations

Guaranteed

• Single authority at any time
• Encrypted secrets at rest and in transit
• Auditable lifecycle
• Minimal blast radius
• Deterministic recovery

Not Guaranteed

• Protection against malicious cluster administrators
• Zero downtime under all failure conditions
• Application-level secret misuse

These require complementary controls.

7.10 Summary

This security model:

• makes trust explicit,
• confines authority,
• and treats compromise as a recoverable event.

Security is achieved not by hiding complexity, but by structuring it correctly.

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