An Interim Secret Management Architecture Using AWS Secrets Manager
Status of This Memo
This document specifies a standards-track architecture for interim secret management within the platform infrastructure. Distribution of this memo is unlimited within the organization and to authorized external reviewers.
This document is a DRAFT and is subject to change based on review feedback.
This RFC describes a temporary architecture that is explicitly designed to be superseded by RFC-SECOPS-0001 once the prerequisite infrastructure (Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, External Secrets Operator, ArgoCD) is operational.
Abstract
This Request for Comments (RFC) defines an interim secret management architecture for platform applications running on on-premises infrastructure. The architecture uses AWS Secrets Manager as a centralized, cloud-hosted secret store accessed directly via the AWS SDK from application code.
This architecture exists because the target secret management system defined in RFC-SECOPS-0001 depends on infrastructure prerequisites that are not yet available: Kubernetes clusters, HashiCorp Vault, External Secrets Operator, and a GitOps delivery pipeline. Until those prerequisites are operational, the platform requires a pragmatic interim solution that centralizes secrets, eliminates scattered credential storage, and establishes naming conventions compatible with the future Vault-first architecture.
The interim architecture intentionally limits its scope to secret storage and consumption. It does not address automated rotation, audit logging, cross-namespace distribution, or policy enforcement. These capabilities are deferred to the target architecture defined in RFC-SECOPS-0001.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2026 ProficientNow Engineering. All rights reserved.
Changelog
| Version | Date | Changes |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2026-02-17 | Initial release |
Scope Boundaries
| In Scope | Out of Scope |
|---|---|
| Centralized secret storage in AWS Secrets Manager | Automated secret rotation |
| AWS SDK-based secret consumption from application code | Audit logging and compliance reporting |
| Secret naming conventions aligned with RFC-SECOPS-0001 | Cross-namespace secret distribution |
| Git-tracked secret inventory manifest (metadata only) | Policy enforcement and access control beyond AWS IAM policies |
| IAM credential authentication from on-premises servers to AWS | Kubernetes Secret management |
| Manual secret population workflow | GitOps-driven secret lifecycle |
| Migration path toward RFC-SECOPS-0001 | HashiCorp Vault deployment or configuration |
Intended Audience
This document is written for:
- Platform & Infrastructure Engineers
- Application Developers consuming secrets
- Security & Compliance Reviewers
- Broader Engineering Organization
No prior knowledge of the internal system is assumed.
Conventions and Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
Table of Contents
Part 1: Foundation
-
- 1.1 Background and Context
- 1.2 Current State (Pre-Architecture)
- 1.3 Why an Interim Solution Is Necessary
- 1.4 Relationship to RFC-SECOPS-0001
-
- 2.1 Core Problem Restatement
- 2.2 Design Goals
- 2.3 Non-Goals
- 2.4 Architectural Invariants
- 2.5 Success Criteria
Part 2: Architecture
-
- 3.1 Architectural Overview
- 3.2 Authority Domains
- 3.3 Trust Boundaries
- 3.4 Data Flow
- 3.5 Failure Domains and Recovery
-
- 4.1 Component Taxonomy
- 4.2 Component Responsibilities
- 4.3 Component Interaction Model
- 4.4 Failure and Recovery Scenarios
Part 3: Operations
- Migration Path
- 5.1 Migration Phases Overview
- 5.2 Phase 0 — Current State (Secrets Manager + SDK)
- 5.3 Phase 1 — Kubernetes Adoption (Secrets Manager + ESO)
- 5.4 Phase 2 — Target State (Vault + ESO)
- 5.5 Naming Convention Continuity
- 5.6 Migration Risks
Part 4: Rationale and Evolution
-
- 6.1 Why This Section Exists
- 6.2 HashiCorp Vault Without Prerequisites
- 6.3 Environment Variables and .env Files
- 6.4 Git-Encrypted Secrets (SOPS, Sealed Secrets)
- 6.5 External Secrets Operator Without Kubernetes
- 6.6 Cloud-Native Secret Stores With Abstraction Layers
-
- 7.1 Supersession by RFC-SECOPS-0001
- 7.2 Interim Architecture Retirement Criteria
- 7.3 Extension Points
- 7.4 What Does Not Change on Supersession
Appendices
Quick Navigation
| Section | Description | Audience |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Introduction | Problem space and motivation | All |
| 2. Requirements | Design constraints and invariants | All |
| 3. Architecture | System overview and trust boundaries | Engineers, Architects |
| 4. Components | System building blocks | Engineers |
| 5. Migration | Path toward RFC-SECOPS-0001 | Engineers, Architects |
| 6. Rationale | Rejected alternatives | Architects |
| 7. Evolution | Supersession and retirement | Architects |
Reading Paths
New to the Platform? Start with Introduction → Requirements → Architecture
Security Review? Focus on Requirements → Architecture → Migration
Understanding Design Decisions? Read Requirements → Rationale → Evolution
Planning the Migration to Vault? Start with Migration → Evolution → RFC-SECOPS-0001

