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Platform RFCs/Secret ops interim

An Interim Secret Management Architecture Using AWS Secrets Manager

RFC-SECOPS-0002ImplementedplatformarchitectureStandards Trackv1.0
Created: 2026-02-17
Updated: 2026-02-17
ReviewersSecurity, Infrastructure, SRE (TBD)
Application DomainSecurity, Secrets Management, SecretOps
                                                            RFC-SECOPS-0002
                                                            Category: Standards Track
                                                            Status: Draft
                                                            Platform Engineering
                                                            February 2026

Status of This Memo

This document specifies a standards-track architecture for interim secret management within the platform infrastructure. Distribution of this memo is unlimited within the organization and to authorized external reviewers.

This document is a DRAFT and is subject to change based on review feedback.

This RFC describes a temporary architecture that is explicitly designed to be superseded by RFC-SECOPS-0001 once the prerequisite infrastructure (Kubernetes, HashiCorp Vault, External Secrets Operator, ArgoCD) is operational.


Abstract

This Request for Comments (RFC) defines an interim secret management architecture for platform applications running on on-premises infrastructure. The architecture uses AWS Secrets Manager as a centralized, cloud-hosted secret store accessed directly via the AWS SDK from application code.

This architecture exists because the target secret management system defined in RFC-SECOPS-0001 depends on infrastructure prerequisites that are not yet available: Kubernetes clusters, HashiCorp Vault, External Secrets Operator, and a GitOps delivery pipeline. Until those prerequisites are operational, the platform requires a pragmatic interim solution that centralizes secrets, eliminates scattered credential storage, and establishes naming conventions compatible with the future Vault-first architecture.

The interim architecture intentionally limits its scope to secret storage and consumption. It does not address automated rotation, audit logging, cross-namespace distribution, or policy enforcement. These capabilities are deferred to the target architecture defined in RFC-SECOPS-0001.


Copyright (c) 2026 ProficientNow Engineering. All rights reserved.


Changelog

VersionDateChanges
1.02026-02-17Initial release

Scope Boundaries

In ScopeOut of Scope
Centralized secret storage in AWS Secrets ManagerAutomated secret rotation
AWS SDK-based secret consumption from application codeAudit logging and compliance reporting
Secret naming conventions aligned with RFC-SECOPS-0001Cross-namespace secret distribution
Git-tracked secret inventory manifest (metadata only)Policy enforcement and access control beyond AWS IAM policies
IAM credential authentication from on-premises servers to AWSKubernetes Secret management
Manual secret population workflowGitOps-driven secret lifecycle
Migration path toward RFC-SECOPS-0001HashiCorp Vault deployment or configuration

Intended Audience

This document is written for:

  • Platform & Infrastructure Engineers
  • Application Developers consuming secrets
  • Security & Compliance Reviewers
  • Broader Engineering Organization

No prior knowledge of the internal system is assumed.


Conventions and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.


Table of Contents

Part 1: Foundation

  1. Introduction and Motivation

    • 1.1 Background and Context
    • 1.2 Current State (Pre-Architecture)
    • 1.3 Why an Interim Solution Is Necessary
    • 1.4 Relationship to RFC-SECOPS-0001
  2. Requirements and Invariants

    • 2.1 Core Problem Restatement
    • 2.2 Design Goals
    • 2.3 Non-Goals
    • 2.4 Architectural Invariants
    • 2.5 Success Criteria

Part 2: Architecture

  1. System Architecture

    • 3.1 Architectural Overview
    • 3.2 Authority Domains
    • 3.3 Trust Boundaries
    • 3.4 Data Flow
    • 3.5 Failure Domains and Recovery
  2. System Components

    • 4.1 Component Taxonomy
    • 4.2 Component Responsibilities
    • 4.3 Component Interaction Model
    • 4.4 Failure and Recovery Scenarios

Part 3: Operations

  1. Migration Path
    • 5.1 Migration Phases Overview
    • 5.2 Phase 0 — Current State (Secrets Manager + SDK)
    • 5.3 Phase 1 — Kubernetes Adoption (Secrets Manager + ESO)
    • 5.4 Phase 2 — Target State (Vault + ESO)
    • 5.5 Naming Convention Continuity
    • 5.6 Migration Risks

Part 4: Rationale and Evolution

  1. Design Rationale

    • 6.1 Why This Section Exists
    • 6.2 HashiCorp Vault Without Prerequisites
    • 6.3 Environment Variables and .env Files
    • 6.4 Git-Encrypted Secrets (SOPS, Sealed Secrets)
    • 6.5 External Secrets Operator Without Kubernetes
    • 6.6 Cloud-Native Secret Stores With Abstraction Layers
  2. Future Considerations

    • 7.1 Supersession by RFC-SECOPS-0001
    • 7.2 Interim Architecture Retirement Criteria
    • 7.3 Extension Points
    • 7.4 What Does Not Change on Supersession

Appendices


Quick Navigation

SectionDescriptionAudience
1. IntroductionProblem space and motivationAll
2. RequirementsDesign constraints and invariantsAll
3. ArchitectureSystem overview and trust boundariesEngineers, Architects
4. ComponentsSystem building blocksEngineers
5. MigrationPath toward RFC-SECOPS-0001Engineers, Architects
6. RationaleRejected alternativesArchitects
7. EvolutionSupersession and retirementArchitects

Reading Paths

New to the Platform? Start with IntroductionRequirementsArchitecture

Security Review? Focus on RequirementsArchitectureMigration

Understanding Design Decisions? Read RequirementsRationaleEvolution

Planning the Migration to Vault? Start with MigrationEvolutionRFC-SECOPS-0001

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